21 件中 1 - 10 件目
| 年度 Year |
題目又はセッション名 Title or Name of Session |
細目 Authorship |
発表年月（日） Date |
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| 発表学会等名称 Name, etc. of the conference at which the presentation is to be given, 主催者名称 Organizer, 掲載雑誌名等 Publishing Magazine，発行所 Publisher，巻／号 Vol./no.，頁数 Page nos. | |||
| 2019 | Optimal FDI Policy in the Economy with Infrastructure Goods | 単独 | 2019/08 |
| 59th Congress of the European Regional Science Association (ERSA 2019) ， The European Regional Science Association | |||
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概要（Abstract） The purpose of this study is to compare the incentive of public investment by public sector in three regimes: (i) monopoly in the final goods market and infrastructure market; (ii) duopoly in the final goods market and monopoly in the infrastructure market, that is, there is inward FDI by foreign final goods firm in the final goods market; and (iii) monopoly in the final goods market and duopoly in the infrastructure market, that is, there is inward FDI by foreign infrastructure firm in the home infrastructure market. Main results are as follows: In the case of (ii) inward FDI in the final goods market and monopoly in the infrastructure market, the optimal level of infrastructure in this economy is smaller than that in monopoly and closed economy. On the other hand, in the case of (iii) monopoly in the final goods market and inward FDI in the infrastructure market, the optimal level of infrastructure in this economy is larger than that in monopoly and closed economy. |
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備考（Remarks）
University of Lyon, Lyon, France |
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| 2019 | Foreign Direct Investment Regulation and Mixed International Joint Ventures | 単独 | 2019/06 |
| Western Economic Association International (WEAI) 94th Annual Conference ， Weatern Economic Association International | |||
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概要（Abstract） It is commonly believed that restrictions against foreign direct investment (FDI) should be removed altogether. However, the following FDI regulations are widely observed: (i) mandating the multinational enterprises (MNEs) to enter through mixed international joint ventures (MIJVs), (ii) imposing foreign equity caps, while (iii) enforcing a simultaneous ban on imports. We seek to understand why and how governments are motivated to adopt these regulations. We demonstrate that these can in fact be the host governments’ optimal choices when regulating the entry of MNEs to medium-sized domestic markets formerly dominated by public monopolists. |
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備考（Remarks）
Hilton San Francisco Union Square, San Francisco, USA |
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| 2018 | FDI Policy and Mixed International Joint Ventures | 単独 | 2018/05 |
| 日本国際経済学会中部支部2018年度春季大会 ， 日本国際経済学会 | |||
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概要（Abstract） It is commonly believed that restrictions against foreign direct investment (FDI) should be removed altogether. However, the following entry restrictions on FDI can be widely observed in the real world: (i) mandating the multinational enterprises (MNEs) to enter through mixed international joint ventures (MIJVs), (ii) imposing foreign equity caps, while (iii) enforcing a simultaneous ban on imports. This paper seeks to understand why and how governments are motivated to adopt these restrictions. We demonstrate that they can in fact be the host governments’ optimal choices when reacting to the entry of MNEs to domestic markets formerly dominated by public monopolists. |
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備考（Remarks）
名古屋市立大学 |
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| 2017 | Host Country's Regulations, Multinational Enterprises' Entry Strategies, and Mixed Markets | 単独 | 2017/05 |
| 25th Pacific Conference of RSAI ， Regional Science Association International | |||
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概要（Abstract） How should a welfare–maximizing government regulate the entry of multinational enterprises (MNEs) into former public monopolies? We demonstrate that it can be optimal to the host country to impose common regulations on foreign direct investment (FDI), namely, (i) mandating MNEs to enter through international joint ventures (IJVs), (ii) equity restrictions on foreign ownership in the IJVs, and (iii) a simultaneous ban on imports. Our results remain robust when (i) the principle of majority rule applies, (ii) when the marginal cost of the IJV depends on its ownership structure, and (iii) when the entry of the MNE generates technology spillovers. |
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備考（Remarks）
National Cheng Kung University, Tainan, Taiwan |
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| 2016 | Regulations on Entry of Foreign Firms and Mixed Enterprises | 単独 | 2016/08 |
| 56th Congress of the European Regional Science Association (ERSA 2016) ， The European Regional Science Association | |||
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概要（Abstract） How should a welfare–maximizing host country regulate the entry of foreign firms into former public monopolies? We demonstrate that two widely–adopted foreign direct investment (FDI) regulations, namely (i) mandating foreign firms to establish international joint ventures (IJVs) with local public firms and (ii) imposing equity restrictions on the degree of foreign ownership in the IJVs can in fact emerge as the host country’s optimal choices. When equity restrictions are inapplicable and with sufficiently high degrees of foreign ownership, restricting the entry mode to exports only would be optimal. Moreover, it is likely that greenfield investment would never be chosen. |
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備考（Remarks）
Vienna University of Economics and Business, Vienna, Austria |
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| 2015 | Regulations on Entry of Foreign Firms and Mixed Enterprises | 単独 | 2016/01 |
| Western Economic Association International (WEAI) 12th International Conference ， Weatern Economic Association International | |||
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概要（Abstract） How should a welfare–maximizing host country regulate the entry of foreign firms into former public monopolies? We demonstrate that two widely–adopted FDI regulations, namely (i) mandating foreign firms to establish international joint ventures (IJVs) with local public firms and (ii) imposing equity restrictions on the degree of foreign ownership in the IJVs can, in fact, emerge as the host country’s optimal choices. When equity restrictions are inapplicable and with sufficiently high degrees of foreign ownership, restricting the entry mode to exports only would be optimal. Moreover, it is unlikely that greenfield investment would ever be chosen. |
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備考（Remarks）
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore |
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| 2015 | Fertility, Mortality, and International Trade Pattern within a Heckscher-Ohlin Framework | 単独 | 2015/11 |
| 2015 Annual Meeting of the Association of Southern European Economic Theorists ， the Association of Southern European Economic Theorists | |||
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概要（Abstract） This paper examines a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with endogenous fertility and mortality. We show that the introduction of endogenous demographic change brings about new properties in long-run dynamics. After an analysis of the existence, uniqueness, and local stability of the long-run equilibrium, we examine each country's long-run trade pattern and gains from trade in the long-run. |
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備考（Remarks）
Abades Nevada Palace Hotel, |
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| 2015 | Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment in Mixed Oligopolies | 単独 | 2015/07 |
| The Eleventh Annual Conference of the Asia-Pacific Economic Association ， the Asia-Pacific Economic Association | |||
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概要（Abstract） How should a welfare–maximizing host country regulate the entry of foreign firms into former public monopolies? We demonstrate that the two widely–adopted FDI regulations, namely, (i) mandating foreign firms to establish international joint ventures (IJVs) with local public firms; and (ii) imposing equity restrictions on the degree of foreign ownership in the IJVs; can in fact emerge as the host country’s optimal choices. When equity restrictions are inapplicable and with sufficiently high degrees of foreign ownership, restricting the entry mode to export only would be optimal. Moreover, it is unlikely that greenfield investment would ever be chosen. |
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備考（Remarks）
National Taiwan University, Taiwan |
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| 2014 | Fertility, Mortality, and International Trade Pattern within a Heckscher-Ohlin Framework | 単独 | 2015/01 |
| Weatern Economic Association International (WEAI) 11th International Conference ， Weatern Economic Association International | |||
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概要（Abstract）
This paper examines a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with endogenous |
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備考（Remarks）
The Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa, Wellington, New Zealand |
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| 2014 | International Cross-Ownership of Firms and Strategic Privatization Policy | 単独 | 2014/11 |
| The 14th Conference of the East Asian Economic Association (14th EAEA conference) ， The East Asian Economic Association | |||
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概要（Abstract） We consider how the international cross-ownership of firms affects the privatization of a public firm competing with foreign firms. We show that when firms compete á la Cournot in a third market under a linear demand function, the domestic ownership of foreign firms can impede privatization, whereas the foreign ownership of the domestic firm can promote privatization. Moreover, the domestic ownership of foreign firms can render neither complete privatization nor complete nationalization optimal under moderate conditions. Conversely, when firms compete á la Bertrand, we demonstrate that it is always optimal to pursue complete nationalization. |
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備考（Remarks）
Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand |
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