2024/11/09 更新

写真b

サイ タイホウ
蔡 大鵬
SAI Taiho
所属
経済学部 経済学科 教授
職名
教授
主な研究課題
長期研究:貿易政策の政治経済学

短期研究:国家間交渉の政治経済学的分析
専攻分野
国際経済政策論、産業組織論、資源・環境経済学

学位

  • 博士(経済学) ( 2003年3月   名古屋大学 )

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    博士

研究分野

  • 人文・社会 / 経済政策  / 国際経済学

  • 人文・社会 / 経済政策  / 環境・資源経済学

  • 人文・社会 / 経済政策  / 産業政策

学歴

  • 名古屋大学   経済学研究科

    - 2003年3月

留学歴

  • 2021年9月 - 2023年2月   カリフォルニア大学サンディエゴ校   客員研究員

論文

  • "Why Do Governments Subsidize R&D-Intensive Foreign Direct Investment?"

    Economic Modelling   129 ( 106550 )   2023年12月

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    出版者・発行元:Elsevier B.V.  

    Subsidizing research and development (R&D)-intensive foreign direct investments (FDI) of multinational enterprises (MNEs)—such as through the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors and Science Act of 2022—is becoming increasingly prevalent worldwide. However, little is known about host governments' incentives for offering them and their strategic potential. Using a simple theoretical model, this study investigates the welfare consequences of an R&D-intensive FDI subsidy compared to those of three other widely used policy alternatives: (i) providing a subsidy based on the MNE's output, (ii) setting the level of intellectual property right enforcement, and (iii) mandating technology transfer through licensing. Our results demonstrate that when the domestic firm's absorptive capacity is sufficiently high, subsidizing MNEs' R&D efforts is welfare-superior to the three other policy alternatives, as it generates positive externalities for domestic firms. Additionally, MNEs' innovation outcomes, profitability, and global welfare can be maximized when an R&D subsidy is chosen. Thus, the findings have key implications for policymakers regarding the welfare consequences of such subsidy policies.

  • "Environmental Regulation, Innovation, and Environmental Performance: Evidence from China"

    経済科学   70   79 - 91   2023年3月

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    出版者・発行元:名古屋大学大学院経済学研究科  

    Will environmental regulations induce firms to innovate and improve their environmental performance? This paper examines the impact of a regulation that mandates heavy polluting industries to save energy and reduce emissions using data from Chinese listed companies. We show that the regulation significantly drive firms to improve their corporate environmental performance,
    while simultaneously inhibiting their innovation activities. We also identify that innovation activities generate a suppression effect between environmental regulation and corporate environmental performance.

  • "Why Do Mandated International Joint Ventures Still Exist?"

    Contemporary Economic Policy   39 ( 1 )   236 - 247   2021年1月

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    出版者・発行元:Wiley  

    It is widely believed that restrictions against foreign direct investment (FDI) should be eliminated altogether. However, local equity requirements (LERs) that effectively mandate multinational enterprises (MNEs) to enter through international joint ventures (IJVs) are still common and are seemingly persistent. We seek to understand why and how governments are motivated to adopt LERs. We demonstrate that LERs can in fact be host governments’ optimal choices when regulating the entry of MNEs into domestic markets formerly dominated by public firms.

  • "Pollution for Sale: Firms’ Characteristics and Lobbying Outcome"

    Environmental and Resource Economics   77   539 - 564   2020年11月

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    出版者・発行元:Springer  

    We consider how the attributes of individual firms may influence the lobbying outcome concerning the setting of the stringency of a costly environmental regulation. We show that when there is a strong asymmetry between firms, a clean firm may lobby to strengthen the regulation, while its dirty rival lobbies to weaken the regulation. Moreover, the lobbying process is asymmetric in that the clean firm finds it more difficult to reach its objectives: although only a sufficiently large clean firm can succeed in strengthening regulation, a relatively small dirty firm can successfully bend a regulation toward its own interest.

  • “To Favor More or Less? Corporate Lobbying over Preferential Treatment to State-owned Enterprises“

    Journal of Regulatory Economics   55   334 - 357   2019年7月

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    出版者・発行元:Springer  

    In OECD and many other countries, state-owned public enterprises normally receive various forms of exclusive preferential treatment that directly affect the profits of all firms, motivating firms to lobby politicians. Using the common agency approach, we show that when state ownership of public enterprises is sufficiently low, i.e., the privatization process is sufficiently advanced, corporate lobbying boosts preferential treatment, causing public enterprises to “advance” as the playing field is tilted in their favor. Conversely, when state ownership is high, corporate lobbying can reduce preferential treatment, causing public enterprises to “retreat” as the playing field levels.

  • “North-South Negotiations on Emission Reductions: A Bargaining Approach”

    Environmental and Resource Economics   71   157 - 177   2018年9月

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    出版者・発行元:Springer  

    This article models North–South negotiations on emission reductions, where the North provides side payments in exchange for the South’s adoption of a more stringent emission standard. We find that depending on where firms compete, strong asymmetry among regions (the two regions’ different valuations of side payments and climate change damage) can produce self-enforcing cooperative agreements. Moreover, the South’s optimal standard choice can be one of two polar cases, i.e., either the “cleanest” or the “dirtiest,” irrespective of the continuum of standards available. The results above can also hold true when both parties bargain over the South’s emission tax.

  • "Admiration is a Source of Multiple Equilibria and Indeterminacy: A Comment on Chen and Hsu (2007)"

    Economics Letters   168   141 - 143   2018年7月

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    出版者・発行元:Elsevier B.V.  

    The aim of this note is to revise and correct the properties of steady state(s) obtained in Chen and Hsu [Economics Letters (2007, 95, pp. 96-103)]. They proved that admiration and decreasing marginal impatience may establish indeterminacy when the steady state is unique. Instead, we prove that, in the long-run equilibrium (equilibria), (i) indeterminacy never occurs when the steady state is unique, and (ii) indeterminacy may occur only when the steady states are not unique.

  • “Greenfield, Merger and Acquisition, or Export? Regulating the Entry of Multinational Enterprises to a Host-country Market”

    International Review of Economics and Finance   56   397 - 407   2018年7月

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    出版者・発行元:Elsevier B.V.  

    How should a welfare-maximizing host government regulate the entry of multinational enterprises (MNEs) that compete with local firms for the host-country market? We demonstrate that the optimal entry regulation depends on the size of the host market: The host government chooses to grant cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) when the host market is sufficiently small; otherwise, it chooses direct export. Greenfield investment, on the other hand, will not be granted. Moreover, we show that for the case of M&A, the MNEs would acquire the most efficient local firm.

  • “International Cross-ownership of Firms and Strategic Privatization Policy”

    Journal of Economics   116 ( 1 )   39 - 62.   2015年6月

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    出版者・発行元:Springer International Publishing AG  

    We consider how the international cross-ownership of firms affects the privatization of a public firm competing with foreign firms. We show that when firms compete á la Cournot in a third market under a linear demand function, the domestic ownership of foreign firms can impede privatization, whereas the foreign ownership of the domestic firm can promote privatization. Moreover, the domestic ownership of foreign firms can render neither complete privatization nor complete nationalization optimal under moderate conditions. Conversely, when firms compete á la Bertrand, we demonstrate that it is always optimal to pursue complete nationalization.

  • “The Invisible Hand, the Helping Hand, and the Grabbing Hand: A Welfare Analysis”

    『経済科学』   第62巻4号   53 - 60   2015年3月

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    出版者・発行元:名古屋大学大学院経済学研究科  

  • “Protection versus Free Trade: Lobbying Competition between Domestic and Foreign Firms”

    Southern Economic Journal   81 ( 2 )   489 - 505   2014年10月

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    出版者・発行元:Southern Economic Association  

    This article considers how political interaction between policymakers and domestic and foreign firms endogenously determines tariff rates. We show that because of lobbying competition between foreign and domestic firms, even a less competitive foreign firm can successfully elicit a tariff reduction under reasonable conditions. Moreover, lobbying competition may also increase the level of aggregate domestic welfare when the market powers of the competing firms are sufficiently alike.

  • “Subsidization and Bargaining in Mixed Oligopolies”

    Bulletin of Economic Research   66 ( 4 )   358 - 373   2014年10月

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    出版者・発行元:John Wiley & Sons, Inc.  

    In this paper, we consider political interaction in a mixed oligopoly by characterizing how a subsidy is endogenously determined through the bargaining process between firms and politicians. We discuss how the nature of the political equilibrium changes with the type of competition, the specification of the cost function, and the timing of the game. We show that when bargaining between firms and politicians takes place, the resulting social welfare may be even worse than that under a public firm monopoly.

  • “Negative Demand Shocks, Knock-on Effects, and Emergency Government Bailouts”

    The Manchester School   81 ( 3 )   243 - 257   2013年6月

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    出版者・発行元:Blackwell Publishing  

    In this paper we consider emergency government bailouts. We show that it is welfare-enhancing to bail out failing firms that are facing a sudden negative demand shock and would otherwise go bankrupt, when there are sufficiently large fixed production costs and knock-on effects (the negative externalities produced by firms' failures that impact on other firms). We also suggest that subsidizing the whole industry at a uniform production subsidy generates a higher level of national welfare than merely subsidizing the failing firms.

  • “Quid Pro Quo and the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights Protection: A Bargaining Approach”

    Journal of International Trade and Economic Development   21 ( 6 )   755 - 772   2012年12月

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    出版者・発行元:Taylor and Francis  

    This article models a North--South negotiation where the North provides a quid pro quo in exchange for the strengthening of the enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection in the South. We show that when Northern and Southern firms compete on quantity in the Southern market, the South's optimal choice is either complete protection or complete violation, irrespective of different levels of IPR protection being available. We show this to depend on the Southern government's valuation of the quid pro quo and the Northern firm's level of technology.

  • 「開放経済における環境資源の保全問題」

    『経済科学』   第59巻3号   67 - 76   2011年12月

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    出版者・発行元:名古屋大学大学院経済学研究科  

  • “To List or To Merge? Endogenous Choice of Privatization Methods in a Mixed Market”

    Japanese Economic Review   62 ( 4 )   517 - 536   2011年12月

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    出版者・発行元:Japanese Economic Association  

    When and how to privatize a public firm? This paper suggests that a welfare-enhancing privatization may be triggered by a negative demand shock. When the shock is relatively mild, it is optimal to privatize a public firm by means of stock market listings; when the shock is sufficiently large, a public–private-firm merger becomes optimal. This paper also considers a government that cares about privatization revenues and about social welfare. It characterizes how the weight attached to privatization revenues and the improvement in production efficiency of the privatized public firm through a stock market listing may affect the government's choices concerning privatization.

  • “Limit of the Solutions for the Finite Horizon Problems as the Optimal Solution to the Infinite Horizon Optimization Problems”

    Journal of Difference Equations and Applications   62 ( 4 )   517 - 536   2011年12月

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    出版者・発行元:Taylor and Francis  

    In this paper, we consider how to construct the optimal solutions for the undiscounted discrete time infinite horizon optimization problems. We present the conditions under which the limit of the solutions for the finite horizon problems is optimal among all attainable paths for the infinite horizon problem under two modified overtaking criteria, as well as the conditions under which it is the unique optimum under the sum-of-utilities criterion. The results are applied to a parametric example of a simple one-sector growth model to examine the impacts of discounting on the optimal path.

  • “Mechanism and Impacts of Embezzlement in a Duopolistic Market”

    Australian Economic Papers   50 ( 1 )   1 - 11   2011年3月

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    出版者・発行元:Blackwell Publishing  

  • “Solving Undiscounted Infinite Horizon Optimization Problems: A Nonstandard Approach”

    ROMAI Journal   Vol. 6, No. 2   199 - 220   2010年12月

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    出版者・発行元:Romanian Society of Industrial and Applied Mathematics  

  • “Environmental Amenities and the Long-run Effects of Conservation Technologies of Renewable Natural Resources”

    『経済科学』   第58巻1号,   1 - 13   2010年6月

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    出版者・発行元:名古屋大学大学院経済学研究科  

  • “Optimal Solutions to the Infinite Horizon Problems: Constructing the Optimum as the Limit of the Solutions for the Finite Horizon Problems”

    Nonlinear Analysis: Theory, Methods and Applications   71 ( 12 )   e2103 - e2108   2009年12月

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    出版者・発行元:Elsevier  

    The limit of the solutions for the finite horizon problems is not always optimal for the infinite horizon problems. In this paper, we provide some special conditions that ensure its validity. It can be applied to constructing the optimal solutions for the undiscounted infinite horizon optimization problems. We also demonstrate a simple example to explain this structure.

  • “Transversality Conditions for Infinite Horizon Optimality: Higher Order Differential Problems”

    Nonlinear Analysis: Theory, Methods and Applications   71 ( 12 )   e1980 - e1984,   2009年12月

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    出版者・発行元:Elsevier  

  • “Transversality Conditions for Infinite Horizon Optimization Problems: Three Additional Assumptions”

    ROMAI Journal   Vol. 5, No. 1   105 - 112   2009年6月

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    出版者・発行元:Romanian Society of Industrial and Applied Mathematics  

  • “Heterogeneous Individuals and the Optimal Level of Higher Education”

    FinanzArchiv   61 ( 5 )   37 - 50   2009年3月

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    出版者・発行元:Mohr Siebeck Verlag  

    We examine the effects of public funding on higher education within a game-theoretical framework, in which universities choose students according to their abilities to learn, whereas to widen the opportunity of receiving higher education, the tuition fees are partially financed by a graduate-tax subsidy system. We find that when individuals are impatient, partial public financing of higher education results in an overinvestment in higher education, which is, however, desirable in terms of improved access.

  • “Sustainable Constant Consumption in a Semi-open Economy with Exhaustible Resources”

    Japanese Economic Review   58 ( 2 )   226 - 237   2007年6月

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    出版者・発行元: Japanese Economic Association  

    To sustain constant consumption, Hartwick's rule prescribes reinvesting all resource rents in reproducible capital. However, Hartwick's rule is not necessarily the result of optimization. In this paper, we address this insufficiency by deriving a constant consumption path endogenously in a semi-open economy with an exhaustible resource, which has full access to world goods and capital markets, while the resource flows are not internationally tradable. Our findings show that, due to the essentiality of both capital and resource to the production process, the economy transforms its domestic assets into foreign ones, consuming a constant interest flow from the latter.

  • “Measuring China’s Sustainability: An Evaluation with Green NNP and Ecological Footprint”

    Far Eastern Studies   Vol. 4   51 - 63   2005年3月

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    出版者・発行元:富山大学極東地域研究センター  

  • “Environmental Administration in China: Past and Present”

    『名古屋学院大学論集・社会科学篇』   第40巻2号   91 - 105   2003年10月

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    出版者・発行元:名古屋学院大学  

  • “Sustainability Constraint and the Equitable Intergenerational Allocation of an Exhaustible Resource”

    Economic Science   第51巻1号   129 - 147   2003年6月

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    出版者・発行元:名古屋大学大学院経済学研究科  

  • “The Effects of Knowledge Accumulation on Intergenerational Allocation of an Exhaustible Resource with Amenity Value”

    Economic Science   第50巻3号   57 - 78   2002年12月

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    出版者・発行元:名古屋大学大学院経済学研究科  

▼全件表示

書籍等出版物

  • 『東亜思想交流史中的脈絡性転換(東アジア思想交流史における脈絡転換)』

    ( 担当: 共著)

    台湾大学人文社会高等研究院東亜儒学研究中心  2022年2月 

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    総ページ数:403‐425  

  • 『現代経済理論と政策の諸問題』

    ( 担当: 共著)

    中京大学経済学部附属経済研究所  2012年6月 

  • 『東アジアの新産業集積: 地域発展と競争・共生』

    ( 担当: 共著)

    学術出版会  2010年11月 

  • 『中小企業的可持続発展与環境保全(中小企業の持続可能な発展および環境保全)』

    ( 担当: 共著)

    科学出版社(中国)  2007年3月 

講演・口頭発表等

  • Why Do Mandated International Joint Ventures Still Exist?

    2019 Taiwan Economic Association Annual Conference  2019年12月  Taiwan Economic Association

  • To Favor More or Less? Corporate Lobbying over Preferential Treatment to State-owned Enterprises

    94th WEAI Annual Conference  2019年6月  WEAI

  • Greenfield, Merger and Acquisition, or Export? Regulating the Entry of Multinational Enterprises to a Host-Country Market

    KIEA Annual Conference  2017年12月  Korea International Economic Association (KIEA)

  • Greenfield, Merger and Acquisition, or Export? Regulating the Entry of Multinational Enterprises to a Host-Country Market

    Singapore Economic Review Conference 2017  2017年8月  Singapore Economic Review

  • Greenfield, Merger and Acquisition, or Export? Regulating the Entry of Multinational Enterprises to a Host-Country Market

    92nd Annual Conference of WEAI  2017年6月  WEAI

  • Greenfield, Merger and Acquisition, or Export? Regulating the Entry of Multinational Enterprises to a Host-Country Market

    PRSCO 2017  2017年5月  RSAI

  • Mutual Recognition for Sale: International Bargaining over Product Standards

    EARIE 2016  2016年8月  EARIE

  • Greenfield, M&A, or Export? Regulating the Entry of Multinational Firms

    ERSA 2016  2016年8月  ERSA

  • Lobbying to Raise Rivals' Costs: The Case of Environmental Regulations

    WEAI 2016  2016年6月  WEAI

  • North–South Negotiations on Emission Reductions: A Bargaining Approach

    PET14  2014年7月  Association for Public Economic Theory

  • Export, Merger, Joint Venture, or Greenfield? Market Sizes and Firms’ Endogenous Choices of Entry Modes

    WEAI 89  2014年6月  estern Economic Association International

  • Export, Merger, Joint Venture, or Greenfield? Market Sizes and Firms’ Endogenous Choices of Entry Modes

    cottish Economic Society 2014 Annual Conference  2014年4月  Scottish Economic Society

  • Lobbying on Entry under Spatial Price Competition

    The 40th Annual Conference of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics   2013年8月  European Association for Research in Industrial Economics

  • Lobbying on Entry under Spatial Price Competition

    WEAI 88  2013年7月  Western Economic Association International

  • Lobbying on Entry

    Euroasia Business and Economics Society (EBES) 2012 Warsaw Conference  2012年12月  uroasia Business and Economics Society

  • Protection versus Free Trade: Lobbying Competition between Domestic and Foreign Firms

    Scottish Economic Society 2012 Annual Conference  2012年4月  Scottish Economic Society

  • Welfare and Policy Implications of Lobbying Competition Between Foreign and Domestic Firms

    2011 Asian Meeting of the Econometric Society   2011年8月  Econometric Society

  • Does Lobbying Competition Increase the Special Favours Received by Privileged Firms?

    Scottish Economic Society 2011 Annual Conference   2011年4月  Scottish Economic Society

▼全件表示

共同研究・競争的資金等の研究課題

  • 地球環境資源問題と世代間公平性:割引のない場合

    2009年

    日本経済研究奨励財団  日本経済研究奨励財団奨励金 

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    担当区分:研究代表者 

  • アイデンティティ経済学に基づく貿易政策の政治経済学的研究―政府間交渉を中心に―

    2020年

    JSPS  科学研究費補助金 基盤研究(C)  基盤研究(C)

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    担当区分:研究代表者  資金種別:競争的資金

  • 規制の政治経済学的研究―企業の政治活動を中心に―

    2020年

    南山大学  南山大学パッヘ研究奨励金I-A-2 

  • To Favor More or Less? Corporate Lobbying over Preferential Treatment to State-Owned Enterprises

    2019年

    南山大学  南山大学パッヘ研究奨励金II-B 

  • ネガティブショックが企業行動に与える影響に関する理論分析

    2019年

    南山大学  南山大学パッヘ研究奨励金I-A-2 

  • ネガティブショックが企業行動に与える影響に関する理論分析

    2018年

    南山大学  南山大学パッヘ研究奨励金I-A-2 

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    担当区分:研究代表者 

  • Greenfield, Merger and Acquisition, or Export? Regulating the Entry of Multinational Enterprises to a Host-Country Market

    2018年

    南山大学  南山大学パッヘ研究奨励金II-B 

  • ネガティブショックが企業行動に与える影響に関する理論分析

    2017年

    南山大学  南山大学パッヘ研究奨励金I-A-2 

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    担当区分:研究代表者 

  • Greenfield, Merger and Acquisition, or Export? Regulating the Entry of Multinational Enterprises to a Host-Country Market

    2017年

    南山大学  南山大学パッヘ研究奨励金II-B 

  • ネガティブショックが企業行動に与える影響に関する理論的分析

    2017年

    JSPS  科学研究費補助金 基盤研究(C)  基盤研究(C)

      詳細を見る

    担当区分:研究代表者  資金種別:競争的資金

  • 突発的なネガティブショックが企業行動に与える影響に関する経済分析

    2016年

    公益財団法人 日東学術振興財団  日東学術振興財団第33回海外派遣助成 

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    担当区分:研究代表者 

  • Lobbying to Raise Rivals’ Costs: The Case of Environmental Regulations

    2016年

    南山大学  南山大学パッヘ研究奨励金II-B 

      詳細を見る

    担当区分:研究代表者 

  • ネガティブショック発生時の企業への最適な救済策に関する理論的分析

    2016年

    南山大学  南山大学パッヘ研究奨励金I-A-2 

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    担当区分:研究代表者 

  • ネガティブショック発生時の企業への最適な救済策

    2015年

    JSPS  科学研究費補助金 若手研究B 

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    担当区分:研究代表者  資金種別:競争的資金

  • 突発的なネガティブショック発生時の,公的資金の注入による企業への最適な救済策と国際協調の在り方

    2013年

    大幸財団  第2回(平成25年度)大幸財団人文・社会科学系学術研究助成 

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    担当区分:研究代表者 

  • 突発的なネガティブショック発生時の,公的資金の注入による企業への最適な救済策と国際協調の在り方

    2012年

    稲盛財団  平成24年度稲盛財団研究助成金 

      詳細を見る

    担当区分:研究代表者 

  • 突発的なネガティブショック発生時の,公的資金の注入による企業への最適な救済策と国際協調の在り方

    2011年

    野村財団  野村財団2011年度研究助成 

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    担当区分:研究代表者 

  • 環境保全義務を果たす環境政策の経済学的研究

    2011年

    JSPS  科学研究費補助金 若手研究B 

      詳細を見る

    担当区分:研究代表者  資金種別:競争的資金

  • 国家間交渉の政治経済学的分析

      詳細を見る

    気候変動への適応や知的財産権の保護といった国家間の交渉が必要とする諸問題の政治経済学的分析

  • 貿易政策の政治経済学

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    国際貿易のルールと貿易交渉の政治経済学的分析

▼全件表示

その他

  • 南山大学社会科学研究科経済学専攻 第30回「イブニング・セミナー経済@南山」

    2018年12月

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    「よくわかる 中国経済の『今』」と題して、経済学の知見から、これまでの経済発展について振り返りながら、中国経済が抱える矛盾点を解説した。

その他教育活動及び特記事項

  • 政治・経済の諸相2

    2021年5月

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    政治・経済の諸相2(副題: 経済のグローバル化について考える)のための講義用パワーポイント資料を、授業計画に即して新たに作成した。

  • 経済学のための数学(中級)

    2020年4月 - 2020年6月

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    経済学のための数学(中級)のための講義用パワーポイント資料を、授業計画に即して新たに作成した。

  • 「経済演習Ⅲ」のインターゼミ

    2019年11月

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    2019年11月2日、太田代ゼミと合同で、華東師範大学(中国上海)の学生とインターゼミを行った。3年生が参加し、日本私立大学の学費の決定要因およびキャッシュレスの普及要因に関する国際比較等について、日々の研究成果を英語で披露した。

  • 「経済演習Ⅲ」のインターゼミ

    2018年11月

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    2018年11月1日、太田代ゼミと合同で、華東師範大学(中国上海)の学生とインターゼミを行った。3年生が参加し、日本の男女賃金格差問題および中部地域における外国人観光客の誘致等について、日々の研究成果を英語で披露した。

  • ミクロ経済学

    2018年9月

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    「ミクロ経済学」(2単位)講義用パワーポイント資料を新たに作成した。 

  • 「経済演習Ⅲ」のインターゼミ

    2018年1月

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    2018年1月13日、太田代ゼミと合同で、華東師範大学(中国上海)の学生とインターゼミを行った。3年生全員が参加し、日本の少子化問題およびアメリカの所得格差問題について、日々の研究成果を英語で披露した。

  • 国際経済政策論B

    2017年11月

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    「国際経済政策論B」講義用パワーポイント資料を新たに作成した。

  • 経済学のための数学

    2017年4月

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    「経済学のための数学」講義用パワーポイント資料を新たに作成した。

  • 国際経済政策論A

    2016年9月

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    「国際経済政策論A」講義用パワーポイント資料を新たに作成した。 

  • ミクロ経済学

    2016年4月

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    「ミクロ経済学」講義用パワーポイント資料を新たに作成した。 

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