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掲載誌名 Journal name,出版機関名 Publishing organization,巻/号 Vol./no.,頁数 Page nos.,発行年月(日) Date
2020  "Why Do Mandated International Joint Ventures Still Exist?"  共著   
Contemporary Economic Policy  , Wiley  , 39/1  , 236-247  , 2021/1   

概要(Abstract) It is widely believed that restrictions against foreign direct investment (FDI) should be eliminated altogether. However, local equity requirements (LERs) that effectively mandate multinational enterprises (MNEs) to enter through international joint ventures (IJVs) are still common and are seemingly persistent. We seek to understand why and how governments are motivated to adopt LERs. We demonstrate that LERs can in fact be host governments’ optimal choices when regulating the entry of MNEs into domestic markets formerly dominated by public firms. 

備考(Remarks) D. Cai, Y. Karasawa-Ohtashiro
DOI: 10.1111/coep.12490
査読付き論文 (Refereed article)  

2020  "Pollution for Sale: Firms’ Characteristics and Lobbying Outcome"  共著   
Environmental and Resource Economics  , Springer  , 77  , 539-564  , 2020/11   

概要(Abstract) We consider how the attributes of individual firms may influence the lobbying outcome concerning the setting of the stringency of a costly environmental regulation. We show that when there is a strong asymmetry between firms, a clean firm may lobby to strengthen the regulation, while its dirty rival lobbies to weaken the regulation. Moreover, the lobbying process is asymmetric in that the clean firm finds it more difficult to reach its objectives: although only a sufficiently large clean firm can succeed in strengthening regulation, a relatively small dirty firm can successfully bend a regulation toward its own interest. 

備考(Remarks) D. Cai, J. Li
DOI: 10.1007/s10640-020-00507-z
査読付き論文 (Refereed article)  

2019  “To Favor More or Less? Corporate Lobbying over Preferential Treatment to State-owned Enterprises“  共著   
Journal of Regulatory Economics  , Springer  , 55  , 334-357  , 2019/7   

概要(Abstract) In OECD and many other countries, state-owned public enterprises normally receive various forms of exclusive preferential treatment that directly affect the profits of all firms, motivating firms to lobby politicians. Using the common agency approach, we show that when state ownership of public enterprises is sufficiently low, i.e., the privatization process is sufficiently advanced, corporate lobbying boosts preferential treatment, causing public enterprises to “advance” as the playing field is tilted in their favor. Conversely, when state ownership is high, corporate lobbying can reduce preferential treatment, causing public enterprises to “retreat” as the playing field levels. 

備考(Remarks) D. Cai, J. Li
DOI: 10.1007/s11149-019-09388-7
査読付き論文 (Refereed article)  

2018  "Admiration is a Source of Multiple Equilibria and Indeterminacy: A Comment on Chen and Hsu (2007)"   共著   
Economics Letters  , Elsevier B.V.  , 168  , 141-143  , 2018/7   

概要(Abstract) The aim of this note is to revise and correct the properties of steady state(s) obtained in Chen and Hsu [Economics Letters (2007, 95, pp. 96-103)]. They proved that admiration and decreasing marginal impatience may establish indeterminacy when the steady state is unique. Instead, we prove that, in the long-run equilibrium (equilibria), (i) indeterminacy never occurs when the steady state is unique, and (ii) indeterminacy may occur only when the steady states are not unique.  

備考(Remarks) Yukio Karasawa-Ohtashiro, Dapeng Cai, Akihiko Yanase
査読付き論文 (Refereed article) 

2017  “Greenfield, Merger and Acquisition, or Export? Regulating the Entry of Multinational Enterprises to a Host-country Market”   共著   
International Review of Economics and Finance  , Elsevier B.V.  , 56  , 397-407  , 2018/7   

概要(Abstract) How should a welfare-maximizing host government regulate the entry of multinational enterprises (MNEs) that compete with local firms for the host-country market? We demonstrate that the optimal entry regulation depends on the size of the host market: The host government chooses to grant cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) when the host market is sufficiently small; otherwise, it chooses direct export. Greenfield investment, on the other hand, will not be granted. Moreover, we show that for the case of M&A, the MNEs would acquire the most efficient local firm. 

備考(Remarks) D. Cai, Y. Karasawa-Ohtashiro
DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2017.11.008
査読付き論文 (Refereed article) 

2016  “North-South Negotiations on Emission Reductions: A Bargaining Approach”  共著   
Environmental and Resource Economics  , Springer  , 71  , 157-177  , 2018/9   

概要(Abstract) This article models North–South negotiations on emission reductions, where the North provides side payments in exchange for the South’s adoption of a more stringent emission standard. We find that depending on where firms compete, strong asymmetry among regions (the two regions’ different valuations of side payments and climate change damage) can produce self-enforcing cooperative agreements. Moreover, the South’s optimal standard choice can be one of two polar cases, i.e., either the “cleanest” or the “dirtiest,” irrespective of the continuum of standards available. The results above can also hold true when both parties bargain over the South’s emission tax.  

備考(Remarks) D. Cai, J. Li
査読付き論文 (Refereed article) 

2015  “International Cross-ownership of Firms and Strategic Privatization Policy”  共著   
Journal of Economics  , Springer International Publishing AG  , 116/1  , pp. 39-62.  , 2015/6   

概要(Abstract) We consider how the international cross-ownership of firms affects the privatization of a public firm competing with foreign firms. We show that when firms compete á la Cournot in a third market under a linear demand function, the domestic ownership of foreign firms can impede privatization, whereas the foreign ownership of the domestic firm can promote privatization. Moreover, the domestic ownership of foreign firms can render neither complete privatization nor complete nationalization optimal under moderate conditions. Conversely, when firms compete á la Bertrand, we demonstrate that it is always optimal to pursue complete nationalization. 

備考(Remarks) D. Cai, Y. Karasawa-Ohtashiro
査読付き論文 (Refereed article) 

2015  “The Invisible Hand, the Helping Hand, and the Grabbing Hand: A Welfare Analysis”  単著   
『経済科学』  , 名古屋大学大学院経済学研究科  , 第62巻4号  , 53-60  , 2015/3   

概要(Abstract)  

備考(Remarks)  

2014  “Protection versus Free Trade: Lobbying Competition between Domestic and Foreign Firms”  共著   
Southern Economic Journal  , Southern Economic Association  , 81/2  , pp. 489-505  , 2014/10   

概要(Abstract) This article considers how political interaction between policymakers and domestic and foreign firms endogenously determines tariff rates. We show that because of lobbying competition between foreign and domestic firms, even a less competitive foreign firm can successfully elicit a tariff reduction under reasonable conditions. Moreover, lobbying competition may also increase the level of aggregate domestic welfare when the market powers of the competing firms are sufficiently alike. 

備考(Remarks) D. Cai, J. Li
査読付き論文 (Refereed article) 

2014  “Subsidization and Bargaining in Mixed Oligopolies”  共著   
Bulletin of Economic Research  , John Wiley & Sons, Inc.  , 66/4  , pp. 358-373  , 2014/10   

概要(Abstract) In this paper, we consider political interaction in a mixed oligopoly by characterizing how a subsidy is endogenously determined through the bargaining process between firms and politicians. We discuss how the nature of the political equilibrium changes with the type of competition, the specification of the cost function, and the timing of the game. We show that when bargaining between firms and politicians takes place, the resulting social welfare may be even worse than that under a public firm monopoly. 

備考(Remarks) D. Cai, J. Li
査読付き論文 (Refereed article) 

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