29 件中 1 - 10 件目
| 年度 Year |
論文題目名 Title of the articles |
共著区分 Collaboration Classification |
NeoCILIUS 請求番号／資料ID Request No |
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| 掲載誌名 Journal name，出版機関名 Publishing organization，巻／号 Vol./no.，頁数 Page nos.，発行年月（日） Date | |||
| 2023 | "Why Do Governments Subsidize R&D-Intensive Foreign Direct Investment?" | 共著 | |
| Economic Modelling ， Elsevier B.V. ， 129/106550 ， 2023/12 | |||
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概要（Abstract） Subsidizing research and development (R&D)-intensive foreign direct investments (FDI) of multinational enterprises (MNEs)—such as through the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors and Science Act of 2022—is becoming increasingly prevalent worldwide. However, little is known about host governments' incentives for offering them and their strategic potential. Using a simple theoretical model, this study investigates the welfare consequences of an R&D-intensive FDI subsidy compared to those of three other widely used policy alternatives: (i) providing a subsidy based on the MNE's output, (ii) setting the level of intellectual property right enforcement, and (iii) mandating technology transfer through licensing. Our results demonstrate that when the domestic firm's absorptive capacity is sufficiently high, subsidizing MNEs' R&D efforts is welfare-superior to the three other policy alternatives, as it generates positive externalities for domestic firms. Additionally, MNEs' innovation outcomes, profitability, and global welfare can be maximized when an R&D subsidy is chosen. Thus, the findings have key implications for policymakers regarding the welfare consequences of such subsidy policies. |
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備考（Remarks） Yingzi Long, Dapeng Cai |
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| 2022 | "Environmental Regulation, Innovation, and Environmental Performance: Evidence from China" | 共著 | |
| 経済科学 ， 名古屋大学大学院経済学研究科 ， 70 ， 79-91 ， 2023/3 | |||
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概要（Abstract）
Will environmental regulations induce firms to innovate and improve their environmental performance? This paper examines the impact of a regulation that mandates heavy polluting industries to save energy and reduce emissions using data from Chinese listed companies. We show that the regulation significantly drive firms to improve their corporate environmental performance, |
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備考（Remarks） WU Ge, LU Zhongyang, CAI Dapeng |
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| 2020 | "Why Do Mandated International Joint Ventures Still Exist?" | 共著 | |
| Contemporary Economic Policy ， Wiley ， 39/1 ， 236-247 ， 2021/1 | |||
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概要（Abstract） It is widely believed that restrictions against foreign direct investment (FDI) should be eliminated altogether. However, local equity requirements (LERs) that effectively mandate multinational enterprises (MNEs) to enter through international joint ventures (IJVs) are still common and are seemingly persistent. We seek to understand why and how governments are motivated to adopt LERs. We demonstrate that LERs can in fact be host governments’ optimal choices when regulating the entry of MNEs into domestic markets formerly dominated by public firms. |
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備考（Remarks）
D. Cai, Y. Karasawa-Ohtashiro |
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| 2020 | "Pollution for Sale: Firms’ Characteristics and Lobbying Outcome" | 共著 | |
| Environmental and Resource Economics ， Springer ， 77 ， 539-564 ， 2020/11 | |||
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概要（Abstract） We consider how the attributes of individual firms may influence the lobbying outcome concerning the setting of the stringency of a costly environmental regulation. We show that when there is a strong asymmetry between firms, a clean firm may lobby to strengthen the regulation, while its dirty rival lobbies to weaken the regulation. Moreover, the lobbying process is asymmetric in that the clean firm finds it more difficult to reach its objectives: although only a sufficiently large clean firm can succeed in strengthening regulation, a relatively small dirty firm can successfully bend a regulation toward its own interest. |
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備考（Remarks）
D. Cai, J. Li |
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| 2019 | “To Favor More or Less? Corporate Lobbying over Preferential Treatment to State-owned Enterprises“ | 共著 | |
| Journal of Regulatory Economics ， Springer ， 55 ， 334-357 ， 2019/7 | |||
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概要（Abstract） In OECD and many other countries, state-owned public enterprises normally receive various forms of exclusive preferential treatment that directly affect the profits of all firms, motivating firms to lobby politicians. Using the common agency approach, we show that when state ownership of public enterprises is sufficiently low, i.e., the privatization process is sufficiently advanced, corporate lobbying boosts preferential treatment, causing public enterprises to “advance” as the playing field is tilted in their favor. Conversely, when state ownership is high, corporate lobbying can reduce preferential treatment, causing public enterprises to “retreat” as the playing field levels. |
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備考（Remarks）
D. Cai, J. Li |
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| 2018 | "Admiration is a Source of Multiple Equilibria and Indeterminacy: A Comment on Chen and Hsu (2007)" | 共著 | |
| Economics Letters ， Elsevier B.V. ， 168 ， 141-143 ， 2018/7 | |||
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概要（Abstract） The aim of this note is to revise and correct the properties of steady state(s) obtained in Chen and Hsu [Economics Letters (2007, 95, pp. 96-103)]. They proved that admiration and decreasing marginal impatience may establish indeterminacy when the steady state is unique. Instead, we prove that, in the long-run equilibrium (equilibria), (i) indeterminacy never occurs when the steady state is unique, and (ii) indeterminacy may occur only when the steady states are not unique. |
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備考（Remarks）
Yukio Karasawa-Ohtashiro, Dapeng Cai, Akihiko Yanase |
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| 2017 | “Greenfield, Merger and Acquisition, or Export? Regulating the Entry of Multinational Enterprises to a Host-country Market” | 共著 | |
| International Review of Economics and Finance ， Elsevier B.V. ， 56 ， 397-407 ， 2018/7 | |||
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概要（Abstract） How should a welfare-maximizing host government regulate the entry of multinational enterprises (MNEs) that compete with local firms for the host-country market? We demonstrate that the optimal entry regulation depends on the size of the host market: The host government chooses to grant cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) when the host market is sufficiently small; otherwise, it chooses direct export. Greenfield investment, on the other hand, will not be granted. Moreover, we show that for the case of M&A, the MNEs would acquire the most efficient local firm. |
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備考（Remarks）
D. Cai, Y. Karasawa-Ohtashiro |
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| 2016 | “North-South Negotiations on Emission Reductions: A Bargaining Approach” | 共著 | |
| Environmental and Resource Economics ， Springer ， 71 ， 157-177 ， 2018/9 | |||
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概要（Abstract） This article models North–South negotiations on emission reductions, where the North provides side payments in exchange for the South’s adoption of a more stringent emission standard. We find that depending on where firms compete, strong asymmetry among regions (the two regions’ different valuations of side payments and climate change damage) can produce self-enforcing cooperative agreements. Moreover, the South’s optimal standard choice can be one of two polar cases, i.e., either the “cleanest” or the “dirtiest,” irrespective of the continuum of standards available. The results above can also hold true when both parties bargain over the South’s emission tax. |
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備考（Remarks）
D. Cai, J. Li |
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| 2015 | “International Cross-ownership of Firms and Strategic Privatization Policy” | 共著 | |
| Journal of Economics ， Springer International Publishing AG ， 116/1 ， pp. 39-62. ， 2015/6 | |||
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概要（Abstract） We consider how the international cross-ownership of firms affects the privatization of a public firm competing with foreign firms. We show that when firms compete á la Cournot in a third market under a linear demand function, the domestic ownership of foreign firms can impede privatization, whereas the foreign ownership of the domestic firm can promote privatization. Moreover, the domestic ownership of foreign firms can render neither complete privatization nor complete nationalization optimal under moderate conditions. Conversely, when firms compete á la Bertrand, we demonstrate that it is always optimal to pursue complete nationalization. |
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備考（Remarks）
D. Cai, Y. Karasawa-Ohtashiro |
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| 2015 | “The Invisible Hand, the Helping Hand, and the Grabbing Hand: A Welfare Analysis” | 単著 | |
| 『経済科学』 ， 名古屋大学大学院経済学研究科 ， 第62巻4号 ， 53-60 ， 2015/3 | |||
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